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Abstract 
 
The  notion  of  Portuguese  exceptionalism  resonated  with  the  European  political  and 
economic  elite  for  some  two  hundred  years:  there  was  a  widespread  belief  that 
Portuguese  society  and  government  existed  outside  of  European  understandings  of 
society, politics and authority relations. In the thirty–five years since the 25 April 1974 
Carnation Revolution, the Portuguese political system has developed new mechanisms 
for debate, elections and policy adoption. Portugal is currently completely integrated into 
Europe  as  a  member  of  the  European  Union,  with  a  democratic  government  and  a 
developing economy. Portugal’s return to the overall pattern of European democratic 
institutions in the years following the 25 April 1974 revolution can be understood as a 
much needed corrective of both Portuguese authoritarianism and its associated notions of 
lusotropicalism:  that  is,  democracy  and  Europe  have  replaced  corporatism  and  the 
Portuguese  overseas  empire  as  two  of  the  key  defining  elements  of  contemporary 
Portuguese  identity.    It  was  certainly  a  long  historical  struggle  from  monarchy  to 
democracy:  the  contemporary  Portuguese  political  system  is  currently  dynamic, 
democratic, durable and European.  
 
 
Napoleon is said to have once quipped that ‘Africa Begins at the Pyrenees’ or ‘Europe 
ends at the Pyrenees,’ given the Moorish conquest and seven hundred year rule of the 
Iberian Peninsula. This notion of Spanish and Portuguese exceptionalism resonated with 
the European political and economic elite for some two hundred years: there was a 
widespread belief that Portuguese society and government existed outside of European 
understandings of society, politics and authority relations. This belief could draw some 
support from the fact that even at the start of the twentieth century, the political views 
still dominating Portuguese political discourse involved a rejection of the democratic and 
liberal revolutions of the modern era (see Payne 1976, Robinson 1979, Manuel 2002).  In 
the 1960s some social science scholars even wondered if the Roman Catholic country 
could ever become democratic, because its hierarchical political culture rejected the 
fundamental Enlightenment values of equality, individualism and the general will (see 
Almond and Verba 1965). Portugal was accordingly viewed among the European 
political and economic elite as existing at the outer orbit of the European existential 
                                                           
1 A revised version of this chapter will be published in Laura C. Ferreira-Pereira, editor, 
Portugal in the European Union: Assessing Twenty-Five Years of Integration Experience 
(London: Routledge, 2010). space, trapped in the historical and philosophical vacuum of overseas exploration and 
lusotropicalism
2 (see Freyre 1942, Martins 1969, and Birmingham 1993). 
Portugal’s return to Europe was complex, multi–dimensional and included many 
people. During the turbulent days following the Carnation Revolution of 25 April 1974, 
one political slogan particularly resonated with the hopes and dreams of the Portuguese 
people: A Europa Conosco (Europe is with us).  This slogan—coined by the Socialist 
Party to help gain electoral support in the 1975 and 1976 elections— spoke to both a 
generalized hope to end the country’s historical isolation from the rest of Europe, as well 
as to a European future of peace and prosperity for Portugal. In many ways, Portugal’s 
successful transition to democracy, and its subsequent adhesion to the European Union, 
were two concrete steps that helped to fulfil the existential hopes pregnant in that slogan. 
Perhaps the starting point of the process took place on 28 April 1974 when 
Socialist leader Mário Soares arrived in Lisbon from his long political exile in Paris, on 
what he called the comboio da liberdade, or the liberty train. He knew that a dramatic 
change had occurred when he was greeted by huge crowds at each train stop—at one 
stop, the train conductor even waited for Soares to tell him when it was time to depart 
(Soares 1976: 24). Lisbon was full of admirers who looked to Soares with great hope and 
anticipation. Arguably, more than any other single individual, Mário Soares’s articulated 
vision of a socialist and European Portugal eventually captured the imagination of most 
Portuguese, and helped propel his party to electoral success over the Communists and 
other rivals in the following years. He subsequently made relevant policy decisions as 
Prime Minister and as President which deepened the democratization and the 
Europeanization process of the country, and resulted in the country’s economic 
integration into the European Union (Manuel 1996b: 17–70).  
 
Democratic Waves 
Placing democratic development on a timeline, Samuel Huntington has usefully 
noted that there have been three main periods of democratic expansion since the 18
th 
                                                           
2 Lusotropicalism is the belief that the Portuguese had a singular civilizing mission in the 
Portuguese Empire. The Salazar regime used this theory as a justification to wage the 
colonial wars. 
 century, which he refers to as ‘waves.’  Huntington’s first long wave lasted some ninety–
eight years, from 1828 to 1926, and includes the development of democratic regimes in 
Great Britain, France, Italy, the United States and Argentina. This first wave suffered a 
setback from 1922 to 1942, when several formerly democratic countries adopted fascist 
governments, including Portugal, Spain, Italy, Germany and Argentina. For the most part, 
these were elite-driven, fragile democratic institutions, with little connection to, or 
support from, civil sectors. Yet, the democratic procedures they introduced into policy-
making processes—limited as they were—were a marked improvement from the 
authoritarian governmental structures which preceded, and followed, this democratic 
interlude. After the Second World War, Huntington notes the development of a second 
democratic wave. This short wave lasted from 1945 until 1962 and includes Japan, West 
Germany, India, Italy and India. This wave was reversed for a second time, and from 
1958 to 1975 several countries abandoned democratic forms of government for military 
regimes, including Brazil, Argentina and Chile. The third wave stated in 1974 with the 
creation of new democracies in Portugal, Spain, Greece, then moving on to Latin 
America in the 1980s, and to East Europe after the events of 1989  (Huntington, 1993: 
13–26). 
Portugal was very slow in accepting democratic values, institutions, and 
procedures during the first wave; in 1910, towards the end of this wave, the Portuguese 
First Republic was finally established by reformers. Although problematic, the reformers 
sought to effectuate political and economic reforms in line with Enlightenment and 
democratic principles (see Wheeler, 1978), The First Republic unfortunately suffered 
through years of governmental instability, economic hardships, and the burden of the 
First World War, and was overthrown by a military coup on 28 May 1926. The military 
sought to restore political order and economic stability, and eventually established the 
anti–modern, anti–European Estado Novo regime, under the leadership of António de 
Oliveira Salazar (see Kay 1970 and Figueirdeo 1976). 
Under Salazar, Portugal maintained some of the vestiges of the First Republic. He 
held the title of Prime Minister, and regularly scheduled elections for the National 
Assembly and the Presidency were held throughout his rule. But this was not a 
democracy: this was a corporative system of government, which limited the actual impact of elections (Manuel 1995: 21–23). For instance, voter registration procedures kept the 
electorate small, and the members of the National Assembly were not allowed to 
significantly influence public policy. Yet, officially recognized political parties were 
allowed some measure of free speech to debate policies during the brief period leading up 
to the election. (see Georgel 1985).  
The most contested election during the Salazar era took place in 1958, when 
General Humberto Delgado, known as the General sem medo (General without fear) ran 
a robust campaign against the Salazar–backed candidate, Admiral Américo Tomás.  
Delgado was a feisty candidate, and even promised to dismiss Prime Minister Salazar if 
elected. Delgado basked in the huge anti–Salazar election rallies he held around the 
country. He was finally defeated in what was most surely a rigged election. Following 
this electoral challenge, Salazar decided to do away with the system of direct presidential 
elections. Delgado continued his anti–Salazar movement, and attempted to overthrow the 
regime by military coup on a few occasions. He was killed in 1965 by members of 
Salazar’s secret police (Marques 1976: 212–235).  
Salazar was finally removed from office in1968 when he slipped into a coma after 
having fallen in his bathroom. His successor, Marcelo Caetano, was overthrown on 25 
April 1974 by young military officers — an event that marks the commencement of 
Huntington’s third wave. Portugal appeared to finally be on the brink of adopting and 
consolidating institutional reforms consistent with the democratic and liberal revolutions 
of post–1789 Europe. 
 
What is Democracy?   
In spite of regularly scheduled elections, Portugal was clearly not a democratic 
regime under the Salazar/Caetano regime. What exactly is a democracy, and how can we 
determine if Portugal indeed has democratized?  
It has always been a very difficult task to define the fuzzy concept known as 
democracy. In the years following the French Revolution, democracy has come to be 
understood to be a political regime predicated upon the people choosing policies and 
leaders. The actual word democracy comes from the Greek, simply meaning rule by the 
people. Over the past two hundred years of living with democratic government, many ascribe a variety of sometimes conflicting meanings to that word:  it could mean a 
political system in which the majority of people maintain and control government, the 
idea of direct democracy. It could also mean a system of representation, whereby the 
people choose their leaders who, in turn, have the ability to pass laws and govern with no 
limits, save perhaps the weight of tradition. Or, there might be a representative 
government functioning under a constituted body of laws, which demarcates the limits of 
what the representative body may do.  There are many other possibilities as well, which 
can lead to great confusion as to its meaning.  
Even the Merriam Webster Collegiate dictionary defines democracy in differing 
ways. It defines democracy both as ‘a government in which the supreme power is vested 
in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of 
representation usually involving periodically held free elections,’ as well as ‘the absence 
of hereditary or arbitrary class distinctions or privileges.’
3 According to the former 
definition, countries that hold free, fair and regularly scheduled elections, in which no 
major adult group is excluded from political participation, such as the United Kingdom 
and Spain, could be defined as democratic. These same countries may not look very 
democratic according to the latter definition, which suggests that democracies cannot 
function within a social backdrop of class distinctions, based on hereditary or other 
reasons. There is a royal family in many countries considered democratic, including the 
United Kingdom and Spain, which enjoys special benefits and privileges not granted to 
all citizens. There are also vast class differences in many democratic countries. The 
reality of class distinctions does make the democratic principle of ‘one citizen, one vote’ 
appear to be somewhat hollow (see Chilcote 2010). This is not to suggest that 
democracies operating with a capitalist economic structure are not democratic regimes; it 
does oblige us to carefully define democracy and to be aware of all of the pitfalls.  
For the purposes of this paper, let us adopt a minimalist institutional definition: to 
be considered a functioning democracy, a regime must hold regularly scheduled free and 
fair elections, in which all adult citizens have been included; these elections must be for 
all political offices, including the highest; and a country must respect the basic civil and 
                                                           
3 Available http://www.m–w.com/cgi–bin/dictionary political rights of its citizens (see Schumpeter 1943, reprinted 2008). If these conditions 
are met, then one could safely refer to a political regime as democratic.  
 
The Revolution of 25 April 1974  
  The development of the Armed Forces Movement is a complicated story 
(Bandeira: 1–56).  In brief, the prolonged and seemingly interminable colonial struggle in 
Africa put great strains on the Portuguese military, especially the junior officers. Many 
had been forced to spend ten or more years in Africa, which disrupted their families and 
careers. The formation of the Armed Forces Movement started principally in response to 
the professional grievances of junior officers, notably their demand for the repeal of 
Decree Law 373–73 (which allowed the milicianos, or conscripted officers, to count all 
of their service toward seniority, moving ahead of professional junior officers). When the 
Caetano administration appeared both disinterested and antagonistic toward their 
demands, the MFA decided that regime change was the only way to repeal Decree Law 
373–73, end the colonial war, and offer a new political model for Portugal. The officers 
responsible for the planning and execution of the 25 April 1974 Carnation Revolution, 
known as the ‘April Captains,’ promised the Portuguese people a political program 
known as the three “d’s,”  meaning democracy, development and decolonization 
(Bruneau 1974: 277–288).
4 However, the members of the Armed Forces Movement 
themselves could not agree as to the content of these terms (Manuel 1995: 26–37).   
During the 1974–1976 revolutionary process, known as the PREC (or the 
Processo Revolucionário em Curso),  the MFA divided into four main ideological 
factions, one in favor of the creation of a West European Social Democratic state, another 
advancing an Eastern Bloc Communist model, a third group preferring the establishment 
of a Cuban–style socialist state, and a traditionalist vision seeking to gradually reform the 
pre–existing authoritarian model. This internal MFA conflict controlled the final 
                                                           
4 The Carnation Revolution (Revolução dos Cravos) was a largely bloodless military 
action, best known for a photo of a young child placing a carnation into the gun of a 
soldier. Some Portuguese people will still wear carnations on the 25
th of April to 
celebrate the event.  
 
 outcome; the victorious faction was able to shape the new form of social and political 
organization. All of the players to implement the “three d’s,” but the actual policy 
preferences varied considerably, depending on their proposed political model (Manuel, 
1995: 55–83. Also see Maxwell 1997). 
 Mário Soares was the leading civilian political leader advancing a West European 
style social democratic model; Communist Party leader Álvaro Cunhal supported the 
Eastern Bloc Communist system of government. Of note, these two leaders had known 
each other for a very long time. In his youth, Soares studied at the Colégio Moderno in 
Lisbon, founded by his father. Álvaro Cunhal was employed as a teacher at the Colégio, 
and actually taught geography to the young Soares. They both opposed the dictatorship of 
António de Oliveira Salazar, and were each imprisoned and exiled (Soares in Paris, 
Cunhal in Moscow). Soares subsequently became a political opponent of Cunhal (Manuel 
1996: 4–6)  
The eyes of Europe were upon Portugal during the PREC. Jean-Paul Sartre, the 
great French existential philosopher, visited Portugal in the spring of 1975. Sartre was 
given a very warm welcome by hoards of young university students. At one of his press 
conferences, Sartre told the students that he considered the Portuguese revolution to be 
one of the most important events in post-war Europe, and called upon them to build West 
Europe’s first socialist state (Sartre, Victor, Gavi: 32-34). Another development of 
European-wide consequence took place on 6 November 1975. Appearing on a French 
television station, Álvaro Cunhal and Mário Soares debated the future of Portugal for 
almost four hours. During this robust back–and–forth, Cunhal praised the equality of the 
Eastern bloc countries, and suggested that their political system would be a good model 
for Portugal. Soares countered by arguing that the person of Joseph Stalin separated the 
Communists from the Socialists, not Karl Marx and/or Vladimir Lenin. Soares railed 
against a ‘socialism of misery’ common to the East. Citing the examples of Germany and 
Sweden, Soares instead proposed a democratic, prosperous and equitable political, social 
and economic system for Portugal.  
What is perhaps most interesting is that this Communist–Socialist debate was 
very current in the 1970s, when the reform communist ideology of Eurocommunism was gaining electoral strength throughout Europe, and especially in Italy.
5 The political 
dynamic in Portugal served to illustrate the larger issues for all Europeans. The decision 
to appear on French television—hence a window to a greater European audience—was a 
dramatic break from the isolation of the Salazar/Caetano years, and opened the floodgate 
to deeper and more European interest and investment into Portugal. The 25 April 1974 
Revolution clearly represented a significant break from the past and to new possibilities 
with Europe (see Gallagher 1983).
6   
The six provisional governments in office from 1974 to 1976 tried to strike a 
balance between macroeconomic challenges and the immediate needs of the Portuguese.  
The on–going political instability and regional actions for social revolution precluded 
stable economic growth; causing great anguish and turmoil among the population (see 
Bermeo 1986).  With each new austerity measure taken by the regime in Lisbon, young 
militants would take direct action against the policy. In the end, rather than bringing law, 
order and progress, the MFA’s own internal divisions became a source of the political, 
economic and social upheaval (Manuel 1995: 55–130). 
By the Spring of 1976, Prime Minister General Vasco Gonçalves, who had been 
in favor of the construction of a East European communist state with Álvaro  Cunhal, and 
Major Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, who had been in favour of the creation of a MFA–Povo  
(MFA–People) alliance,  had been politically outmanoeuvred and discredited by the MFA 
moderate group known as the ‘Group of Nine.’ These moderate officers gained control of 
the Council of the Revolution by July of 1976, and enjoyed the widespread support of 
political society, including Mário Soares’s Portuguese Socialist Party, the Popular 
Democratic Party (PPD) led by Francisco Sá Carneiro, and Freitas do Amaral’s Party of 
the Social Democratic Centre (CDS). Only the Communist Party, which enjoyed about 10 
percent of electoral support, regretted this turn of events, but it too eventually accepted 
the new democratic rules and institutions. In time, all of the more militant and leftist anti–
democratic elements were forced out of political process.  
                                                           
5 The Eurocommunism movement in the 1970s was inspired by the writings of Italian 
Socialist Antonio Gramsci.  This movement supported West European democratic 
institutions and criticized the human rights abuses of Soviet communism. 
6 The November 1975 Soares-Cunhal debate is available on YouTube at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gen8NmL5g70  and 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yYbEUMyjtts&feature=related . The defeat of both leftist and rightist anti–democratic elements facilitated the 
Europeanization of the political regime (Linz 1977: 237–296). That is, in spite of the 
serious differences of opinion among those who survived the transition, there were no 
significant anti–democratic political forces in Portugal after 1976. Those remaining 
political forces represented a narrow ideological spectrum, and subsequent party 
formation followed the overall European model (Corkill 1993: 517–532 and Manuel 
1996: 10–11). The pro–European victors adopted the classical ideas of social democracy, 
abandoning Marxist ideology and supporting the liberalization of the economy and 
integration with Europe.  
There are currently six major ideological expressions among political society in 
Portugal. On the left, there are three organizations: the Portuguese Communist Party, 
(PCP, Partido Comunista Português), the Left Bloc, (BE, Bloco de Esquerda), and the 
Green Party (PEV, Partido Ecologista or ‘Os Verdes’). The centre–left is occupied by the 
Socialist Party, (PS, Partido Socialista). The center–right is taken by the Social 
Democratic Party, (PSD, Partido Social Democrata), and the Centrist Social Democrat 
Party, also called the People’s Party, is on the right, (Centro Democrático e Social/ 
Partido Popular) (Manuel 1996: 4–6)   
Of these six political parties, only two have governed since 1976: the Socialist 
Party and the Social Democratic party. Together, they comprise the centre–left and 
centre–right sides of the political spectrum, and combined they represent a more 
moderate, centrist elements of the population. The Social Democrat Party (PSD) is very 
strong in the central and northern regions of the country, representing a more 
conservative electorate; the Socialist Party (PS) enjoys strong support in the cities and in 
the central and southern regions. The PS essentially supports a reformist capitalist 
agenda, not an anti–capitalist one, and is significantly more progressive on cultural issues 
than the PSD. We can identify similar patterns throughout Europe. In Spain, for instance, 
the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) on the left, and the Popular Party (PP), on 
the right, function similarly to the PS and PSD in Portugal. The same general pattern of 
ideological and political party formation holds in Italy and France as well. 
 
 Key Institutional Elements of Portuguese Democracy 
The Portuguese Constitution of 1976, and its subsequent revisions of 1982 and 
1989, created a dual–executive, or semi–presidential regime in Portugal. The dual–
executive institutional arrangement contains elements from both presidential and 
parliamentary systems. This system was first designed by French President Charles 
DeGaulle, with the creation of the Fifth Republic Constitution in 1958. In contrast to the 
well–known French system of approximate constitutional parity between the President 
and Prime Minister in many areas, however, the Portuguese dual–executive model can be 
better described as a parliamentary system with a separately elected, presiding executive 
officer. In Portugal, the law–making function is under the jurisdiction of the Prime 
Minister and the National Assembly. Portugal has a unicameral legislature, called the  
Assembleia da República. Small and homogeneous unitary nation–states frequently prefer 
one legislative body over two, such as Sweden and Greece—whereas a bicameral 
legislature exists in Spain. There is a two hundred and thirty seat Parliament, with four 
year terms, and twenty–two multi–seat constituencies.
7 
The Constitution grants the President independent authority and legitimacy 
outside of the National Assembly.  He is expected to monitor the activities of the 
government, and has veto power. In the event of a serious deadlock in the National 
Assembly, the President has the constitutional power to ensure governmental balance and 
accountability: the President may dismiss the Prime Minister, appoint a new Prime 
Minister or call for new elections. He also serves as the Commander–in–Chief. The 
President is elected by universal suffrage to a five–year term, and no president may serve 
more than two consecutive terms. Any President is also permitted to run for a third and 
final term, as long as it is not consecutive with the previous terms. (Constituição da 
República Portuguesa 1990: 228 –231).  Although these powers seem to provide the 
Portuguese President with quite a bit of leverage, his or her actual power is somewhat 
less than what it may seem.
8  
                                                           
7 Eighteen districts from the continent, one for the Azores, one for Madeira, one for 
Portuguese living in Europe and one Portuguese living elsewhere 
8 President Sampaio removed the wayward government of Pedro Santana Lopes in 2004, 
and called for new elections, even though Santana Lopes enjoyed an absolute majority in 
the National Assembly. So this power is used; but it is not a frequent occurrence. Similar to many European democracies, Portugal functions under a multi–member 
district, proportional representation system for the election of members to the National 
Assembly. Legislative seats are allocated in proportion to the votes received by each 
party, based the d'Hondt method.
9 Proportional representation systems encourage the 
formation of coalition governments among the various political parties, especially if no 
single party enjoys an absolute majority of seats. The coalition among political parties is 
a solution to this problem, when two or more parties agree to a common legislative 
program (Manuel and Cammisa 1998: 26–35). 
 
Five Milestones on the Road to Portuguese Democratization 
The development of democratic institutional norms has taken time. Portugal has had to 
pass several milestones—or significant events—on the road towards the consolidation of 
its democratic regime.  These are, namely, the issues of getting the new dual executive 
arrangement up and running, civilian control of the military, integration into the 
European Economic Community, building electoral alliances across ideological 
differences, and the peaceful alternation of power. Let us now turn to each of these five 
milestones, in chronological order. 
The first milestone involved getting the new Constitutional dual executive system 
to actually function.  As in France, the dual executive arrangement embodied in the post 
1976 Portuguese Constitutional regime was complicated, and there was some potential 
for serious  institutional deadlock should the Prime Minister not accept the directives of 
the President. Following the June 1976 Presidential elections, President Ramalho Eanes, 
a military hero of the transition, and the leader of the now defunct Partido Renovador 
Democrático (Democratic Renewal Party, or PRD) was elected President. Mário Soares 
was elected as the first Constitutional Prime Minister, presiding over a minority Socialist 
government. The two executives needed to figure out how their constitutional roles 
would interact, as their actions were establishing the very foundation of the new 
democracy.  
                                                           
9 Variations of this system are used in many countries, including Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, Portugal, and Spain. In the National Assembly, Prime Minister Soares had to deal with frequent 
challenges by the opposition to his legislative initiatives: each time his government 
stalemated with the other parties, overall power and authority shifted to the President. 
After two years of Socialist minority rule and general governmental instability, President 
Eanes became widely perceived as the saviour of the democratic system from the 
political parties.  
Throughout this period, Soares did not seek to block Eanes from intervening in 
parliamentary affairs; rather, he used his considerable political skill to build confidence in 
the workings of the new constitutional regime during this period of economic hardship 
(Manuel 1996: 25). The frequently tense—but overall functional—working relationship 
between the President and Prime Minister at the dawn of the new Constitutional 
arrangement was absolutely critical for the institutionalization of new democratic norms; 
their success at developing their respective constitutional roles represents the 
accomplishment of a first milestone.   
A second milestone dealt with the removal of the military from the political 
equation. When the MFA left active politics in 1976, they sought to institutionalize their 
revolutionary role with the creation of a non–elected body known as the Council of 
Revolution, which was granted the Constitutional power to veto any law passed by the 
legislature which it alone determined to be anti–revolutionary. The Council was solely 
composed of military officers, chosen by the military, which stood atop of the elected 
politicians. The Council was given the charge to protect the revolution, and in particular, 
to defend the constitutional language which set the overall goal of the democratic regime 
to create a classless society. This situation was entirely undemocratic, and was eventually 
remedied with the 1982 Constitutional amendment abolishing the Council. 
In the 1979 parliamentary elections Portuguese voters opted for the conservative 
Democratic Alliance platform of Francisco Sá Carneiro, the leader of the PSD, who had 
formed a conservative alliance with the CDS. Sá Carneiro became Prime Minister in 
January 1980, and immediately sought to implement reforms to liberalize the economy, 
and move Portugal away from socialism. However, before he could get much accomplished, Sá Carneiro died in a plane crash in 1980, and Francisco Pinto Balsemão 
became Prime Minister, also from the PSD.
10  
Balsemão reached out to Mário Soares, and gained his support to significantly 
amend the 1976 Constitution. Soares had frequently been frustrated by President Eanes’s 
role during the first Constitutional government, and was very much in favour of 
enhancing the Constitutional powers of the Prime Minister. In 1982, with the support of 
the CDS, PSD and PS, the National Assembly amended the Constitution by abolishing 
the Council of the Revolution. This amendment also limited the President’s ability to veto 
legislation or dissolve parliament. The overall goal of creating a classless society was 
finally eliminated in the 1989 Constitutional revision (Manuel 1996: 37-50, 64).  
To their credit, the members of the Council of the Revolution accepted this 
amendment, and left politics for good (Graham 1993:82–88). They subsequently formed 
themselves into an old–officers club, known as the Association of 25 April. The removal 
of the military from the political equation, and the associated assertion of the supremacy 
of civilian rule, were clearly necessary steps for the creation of a genuine democracy. The 
1982 Constitutional amendment was a vital step in the Europeanization of the new 
Portuguese political regime. 
The third milestone was reached when Portugal finally joined the European 
Economic Community, now called the European Union, on 1 January 1986. Portugal had 
been a marginal player in Europe for the first six decades of the twentieth century. Of 
course, it was a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, given the regime's 
strong anti–communist stance, and the strategic importance of Lajes Air force base in the 
Azores. Portugal also joined the European Free Trade Association in 1959. Yet, to all 
intents and purposes, the country was essentially blocked from any meaningful dialogue 
by the leading European states, given their displeasure with Portuguese authoritarianism. 
The European Economic Community only allowed democratic states to become 
members—a requirement which kept the Salazar/Caetano regime out of the European 
organization. Following the events of 25 April 1974, and the subsequent transition to, and 
consolidation of, democracy in Portugal, all of this changed, and membership in the EEC 
                                                           
10 The circumstances of the plane crash have led to speculation that Sá Carneiro was 
killed by the remaining far left-wing elements of the MFA, but nothing has even been 
conclusively proven. became a possibility. The new financial resources which became available after 1986 
both stabilized the economy and led to the creation of a modern infrastructure: these 
funds represented 3.3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in Portugal from 1994 to 
1999. Political will was clearly an essential ingredient for the establishment of democracy 
in Portugal; subsequent European economic support significantly aided the successful 
consolidation of the new democratic regime (Manuel and Royo 2004: 1–31). 
The fourth milestone involved coalition–formation and alliance–building across 
the ideological spectrum. This was accomplished during the 1986 Presidential election, 
which was the first presidential election since 1976 without an important military 
candidate. There were four major candidates competing in that election.  A coalition of 
center–right forces (CDS and PSD) supported Diogo Freitas do Amaral, the founder and 
leader of the CDS. Amaral pledged a return to conservative and reformist policies, and to 
essentially roll back the progressive policies adopted under the Socialist regimes, by 
policies of  economic liberalization inspired by Prime Minister Thatcher’s economic 
reforms in the United Kingdom. The united right confronted a divided left: Mário Soares, 
former Prime Minister Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo and Francisco Salgado Zenha, all 
Socialists, sought the Presidency. Of note, Zenha was viewed as an anti-Soares candidate, 
and enjoyed the support of both outgoing President Eanes and the Communist Party. 
 The first round of voting took place on 6 February 1986, and produced a stunning 
result: Freitas do Amaral came within 3 points of an outright victory, with 47 percent of 
the total votes cast. Soares came in a distant second (25 percent), followed by Zenha (21 
percent) and Pintasilgo (seven percent). Portugal uses a two–ballot procedure for its 
presidential election, which means that if no candidate wins over 50% of the vote on the 
first ballot, a second ballot is held between the two top vote getters. In the run-off 
election on 16 February 1986, Soares emerged victorious with 51 percent of the vote. 
(Manuel 1996:60–64). A united coalition of left-wing forces barely defeated the united 
coalition of right-wing forces; the slight margin of victory has been partially credited to a 
belief among voters that Soares’s connections could help Portugal deepen its relationship 
with Europe and the wider world. In this regard, the International Socialist Movement 
afforded the Socialist Party a strategic advantage in the elections. Mario Soares had well 
known friendships with many European Socialist leaders, including Harold Wilson of the United Kingdom, Olaf Palme of Sweden, François Mitterand of France and Willy Brandt 
of Germany. The Socialist Party argued that these connections would help bring Portugal 
back into a European framework.  
The 1986 Portuguese election also fits into a larger European dynamic: the 2002 
French Presidential elections is a case in point. Like Portugal, France also uses a two 
ballot electoral system. Among the sixteen political parties presenting presidential 
candidates in 2002, the two candidates expected to face off in the second round of voting 
were incumbent President Jacques Chirac of the conservative Rally for the Republic 
party, and his erstwhile rival, Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin. As expected, Chirac 
did obtain the most votes in the first round of voting, with 19.88 percent of the vote. 
However, Jospin, with 16.18 percent, finished just behind the far right wing candidate, 
Jean-Marie Le Pen of the National Front Party, who received 16.86 percent of the ballots.  
The surprising electoral strength of Le Pen stunned even the most seasoned 
political observers.  Indeed, his third place finish behind Le Pen humiliated socialist 
Lionel Jospin, who immediately decided to resign from politics, stating “I assume full 
responsibility for this defeat and I will consequently retire from politics after the end of 
the presidential elections
11 
In 2002, Jacques Chirac faced Jean-Marie Le Pen in the second round of voting. 
Running on a law and order platform, Le Pen tapped into the fears and anxieties of a 
significant percentage of the French electorate. Among his promises, Le Pen sought to 
curb immigration into France, place a ban on the building of mosques, and build more 
prisons. The prospects of an elected French government closing its borders to the outside 
world, rounding up thousands of immigrants, and curtailing the free expression of 
religion, all in the name of law and order, disturbed lovers of democracy everywhere. 
Many French citizens wondered how they could ever adopt such xenophobic policies in 
the land that offered the world the universalistic and democratic principles of liberté, 
égalité, fraternité during their revolution of 1789. 
                                                           
11 Available 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1899000/1899029.stm  Also see 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1943000/1943193.stm  
 This presidential election did indeed make history: for the first time in modern 
French politics, communist, socialist and other leftists joined the Gaullists and others on 
the right in an anti-National Front alliance. Many simply voted against Le Pen, and found 
Chirac acceptable because his policies functioned within the French democratic tradition 
of universal rights. Some left-wing voters actually wore clothespins on their noses in the 
voting booth as a protest against the ‘stench’ of having to choose, in their view, a lesser 
evil. Arguably, at the end of the day, the good sense of the majority acted as a check to 
the fears of the minority: the broad-based electoral coalition enabled Chirac to win 
reelection by the impressive margin of 82.21 percent to 17.79. In his victory speech, the 
President reaffirmed France’s commitment to its democratic and universalistic principles, 
“We have lived through a time of grave concern for the nation, but tonight, in a massive 
surge, France has reaffirmed its attachment to the values of the republic. I hail France, 
true to itself, true to its lofty ideals, true to its universal and humanist mission.”
12 
  Combined, the cases of the 1986 Portuguese Presidential Elections and the 2002 
French Presidential elections offer us a revealing window into the perils and possibilities 
of a political system predicated on the rule by the people.  In order for the system to 
sometimes work, individuals and groups with very different ideological views must 
cooperate. Coalition–formation among competing ideological factions for a greater goal 
is an essential milestone in the consolidation of democracy in any country, especially 
those functioning under the d'Hondt method of allocating parliamentary seats. 
The fifth milestone involves the peaceful alternation of power among competing 
political parties. The new Portuguese democracy has performed well in this area; the 
office of the presidency has provided both stability and accountability since 1976. There 
have been four different presidents from three different parties elected to office in the 
past thirty–four years; namely President Ramalho Eanes (1976–1985) of the PRD; 
President Mário Soares (1986–1996) of the PS; President Jorge Sampaio (1996–2006) of 
the PS; and, President Aníbal Cavaco Silva, of the PSD, who was elected in 2006 and 
remains in office.  
                                                           
12 Available 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1899000/1899029.stm (accessed 
31 January 2010). There is similar success in the National Assembly, where Portugal’s two leading 
parties—the PS and the PSD—have alternated power since 1976. In the most recent 
elections in 2009, Prime Minister José Sócrates and his Socialist Party garnished 36.6 
percent of the vote, down from 45% in the previous elections in 2005, giving the party 96 
seats in the 230 seat parliament, from their previous total of 121 seats. Under the 
leadership of Manuela Ferreira Leite, the PSD won 78 legislative seats in 2009, up from 
75 seats in 2005, with 29.1 percent of the vote. Smaller parties on both ends of the 
ideological spectrum also won some electoral support, and seated candidates as well.
  
This overall pattern is similar to Spain. The Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE, or 
the Socialist Workers’ Party) and the Partido Popular (or People’s Party, PP) have 
dominated Spanish politics since the 1976 democratic transition.  Prime Minister Jose 
Luis Rodriguez Zapatero of the PSOE was first elected in 2004, and was re–elected in 
2008. Spanish civil society has since become accustomed to democratic procedures (see 
Pérez–Diaz, 1993). 
These five accomplished milestones have resulted in the creation of the new 
democratic state in Portugal. We can realistically refer to the contemporary political 
regime in Portugal as a functioning democracy in the larger European tradition because it 
has both adopted and then institutionalized three foundational criteria: first, free and fair 
elections have been held on a regular basis in which adult citizens have been included 
since 1976; second, these elections have been open for all offices, including the highest 
and most powerful political roles; and third, basic civil and political rights are respected 
in Portugal (see Schumpeter 1943, reprinted 2008). Civil society has developed robust 
democratic structures in the years since 1974, and the prospects for continuing 
democratic governance are excellent (Manuel and Hamann 1999: 71–99). 
To be sure, democracy is practiced imperfectly in Portugal as well as in most of 
the countries that fulfil these three criteria. Even so, Schumpeter’s minimalist 
institutional definition captures the political essence of what a democracy does, and as 
such, is a useful way to understand Portuguese democracy. These criteria—which have 
become the standard of the West European democratic regimes— had eluded Portuguese 
politics throughout the 48 year Salazar/Caetano regime, and indeed, had never been 
formally part of the Portuguese body politic before 25 April 1974. Conclusion 
Portuguese exceptionalism is no more. The return to Europe and the associated 
democratization of the Portuguese political system can be understood as a much needed 
corrective of both Portuguese authoritarianism and its associated notions of 
lusotropicalism: that is, democracy and Europe have replaced corporatism and the 
Portuguese overseas empire as two of the key defining elements of contemporary 
Portuguese identity.
13  In the thirty–five years since the 25 April 1974 Carnation 
Revolution, the Portuguese political system has developed new mechanisms for debate, 
elections and policy adoption. Portugal is currently completely integrated into Europe as 
a member of the European Union, with a democratic government and a developing 
economy. Whatever the merits or faults of the current democratic system in Portugal, it is 
certainly time to place the old adages that ‘Africa begins at the Pyrenees,’ or that ‘Europe 
ends at the Pyrenees’ in the rubbish bin for good. 
                                                           
13 ‘Fátima , fado, and football’ arguably remain as three other defining characteristics of 
what it means to be Portuguese today: Fátima refers to the believed apparitions of the 
Blessed Virgin Mary to three shepherd children at Fátima on the 13th day of six 
consecutive months in 1917, starting on May 13; fado, meaning destiny or fate, is a 
Portuguese musical form characterized by sad, soulful sounds and lyrics, typically about 
the hardships of the poor or of the sea; football refers to the national pastime of soccer, 
which captivates the nation with every kick of the ball. References   
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